POLITICS, STRUCTURE, AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE CASE OF HIGHER EDUCATION
The relationship between government structure and performance can be dated to both the debates over the U.S. Constitution and the attempts by ancient philosophers such as Aristotle to design the ideal polity. Unfortunately, until recently, systematic empirical attention to this issue in higher education has not been a high priority (McLendon forthcoming). Using formal work from the political control of bureaucracy literature (McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987; Moe 1990 ) as its guide, political scientists (Lowry, 2001 and Knott and Payne, 2002) have started an empirical investigation of the role that structure plays in determining higher education policy outputs. A second branch of empirical work by education scholars grows out of organization theory and a substantive interest in higher education (see Hearn and Griswold 1994; Hearn, Griswold, and Marine 1996; McLendon, Heller and Young 2002; Volkwein 1986; Zumeta 1992 Zumeta , 1996 .
The structure question in higher education links to an important theoretical literature in political science. Structural questions are an essential part of the political control literature because some advocates believe that structures are little more than hardwired political biases that affect who benefits from administrative decisions (McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987) .
Structures, however, have a second function. They set the rules of game and, thus, advantage some interests rather than others without actually hardwiring biases into the system. As an illustration, providing for legislative oversight of administrative agencies advantages the political interests who control the legislature but does not guarantee that the wishes of one faction will forever triumph over another (Moe 1990 ). Lowry (2001) , in his seminal study of structures and higher education, demonstrated the first aspect of higher education structures; they 2 are associated with the distribution of policy benefits (in a different tradition see similar studies by Hearn and Griswold 1994; Hearn, Griswold, and Marine 1996; McLendon, Heller and Young 2002; and Volkwein 1986; . This paper examines the second dimension of higher education structures; do some structures facilitate or impede the political forces regardless of ideology?
Any assessment of higher education governance structures must recognize that the agencies responsible for implementing postsecondary education policy differ markedly across the nation. Three distinct structures are used to govern higher education at the state level--consolidated governing boards, coordinating boards, and planning/service agencies. While the number of consolidated governing boards approximately equals the number of coordinating boards, only two states have planning/service agencies. Because of differences in the scope of their activities and the control they have over important functions such as budgeting, these boards differ both in autonomy and the degree of centralization. This paper uses structural theories of politics to derive and test hypotheses about individual governing boards and their ability to insulate policies from politics. In an important addition to previous studies, this analysis also controls for the means by which agencies receive their power.
First, the theoretical relationship between structure and policy outcomes will be outlined.
Second, a description of the structures and powers of the three types of governing boards is presented. Third, a short review of the literature that examines the effects of politics on bureaucratic structure will provide a set of contrasting hypotheses. Finally, a preliminary test of these hypotheses linking structure and politics will involve a quantitative analysis of how higher education costs are distributed among tuition, state appropriations, and need-based aid.
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND THEORY
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A number of structural dimensions must be addressed in order to comprehend fully how a board's structure affects the insulation of the costs of higher education from political forces. As a first step this study will deal with two issues conceptually-autonomy and centralization. 1 We will do so using insights from both organizational theory and the literature on bureaucratic politics. Seidman (1970) argues that political structures determine power and that organizational structures are an instrument of politics, position, and power. He contends that there are critical differences between institutional types in terms of the composition of the directing authority (single or multi-headed), qualifications for appointment, procedures for the appointment and removal of principal officers, method of financing, budget and audit controls, personnel regulations, and advisory councils and committees (Seidman 1970, 242; Meier 1980 ).
According to Seidman these provisions determine the degree of organizational and operating autonomy as well as the relationship between an agency and its political environment (but see Volkwein 1986 ).
The tension between autonomy and political control is obvious. Scholars argue that for a bureaucracy to implement policy effectively it must have a certain level of autonomy and that autonomy allows for insulation from politics (Meier 2000; Selznick 1948; Wilson 1989; Ingram 1990; West 1997 ). This autonomy and power then influences the ability of an agency to reshape legislation in a way that more closely fits its mission. According to Rourke (1969, 43) , agencies that are highly professional in their orientation are allowed a degree of independence and autonomy not afforded to all public agencies. The level of autonomy is important to this study, as is the level of discretion that an agency has to choose the way that it will carry out its mission (Meier 2000) . Agency structure can have some role in determining the level of autonomy.
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A combination of these theories leads us to the proposition that bureaucracies structured to be insulated from politics have a greater degree of autonomy and greater control over policy outcomes. If structures allow for influence from political changes, the likelihood of autonomy for the organization decreases. This study examines the structures of higher education boards to gain a better understanding of how they affect policies pertaining to higher education. To the extent that variation in governance structures is correlated with bureaucratic autonomy, it should correlate with differences in the ability of elected officials to influence policies pertaining to education.
A second structural view of bureaucracy deals with the notion of centralization and decentralization. To the degree that organizations are centralized, the transaction costs are lower for individuals seeking to influence overall agency policy. Political actors focus their attention on a single geographic site rather than multiple sites that might be adapting to different sets of institutional arrangements and different local environments. Despite the conclusions of Seidman that decentralized bureaucracy exists to match the structure of Congress (read the legislature), any political institution seeking to control a bureaucracy has lower transactions costs in a centralized bureaucracy, if all other things are equal. The perceived centralization benefit, in fact, has specifically guided the design of higher education structures (see McGuinness 1999;
McLendon forthcoming and the citations therein).
HIGHER EDUCATION GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES
Much of the literature concerning postsecondary education policy debates how much the structure of higher education systems affects higher education policies. Studies focus on the power of the governor, the character of the governing system, and the effects of the market. Richardson et al. (1999) discuss the importance of political actors in the governance of higher 5 education as well as the increased interest of these parties in existing systems. With a seven state comparative study, they examine the structures of state education boards and how state governments influence education policies. Jones et al. (1998) provide a generalized overview of higher education governance and attempt to set a research agenda for further examination in this area. Zumeta (1992) provides a broad study of the effects of changes in state tuition and board structures on scholarships for private universities. Hearn, Griswold and Marine (1996) show that higher education structures are associated with changes in tuition costs and financial aid, but the relationships are not always consistent across types of institution (e.g., four year versus two year). Hearn and Griswold (1994) find these structures affect innovation rates among higher education systems. McLendon, Heller and Young (2002) examine six policy innovations dealing with finances and accountability; they find modest influences of structure. Volkwein (1986; , in contrast, found no relationship between structural autonomy and the quality of education offered. Hearn, 6 Griswold and Marine 1996), he also suggests that structures can enhance political control (see also Knott and Payne 2002, 6 Coordinating boards differ from consolidated governing boards in that they do not govern institutions, they do not appoint institutional chief executives or set faculty personnel policies.
They appoint, set compensations for, and evaluate only the board's chief executive officer and staff. The governor is sometimes actually responsible for appointing the agency executive but usually on the recommendation of the coordinating board. Coordinating boards do not have corporate status independent from the state government (ECS 1997). They focus on state and system needs and priorities rather than advocating interests. They may or may not review and make recommendations on budgets for the state's system. The limited scope of these boards means that they have less power.
Some coordinating agencies recommend consolidated budgets for the whole system while others make recommendations to the governor or state legislature on individual or segmental budgets. Most coordinating boards, however, have responsibility for implementing budget policy only for funds appropriated specifically to the agency (as opposed to appropriations to the individual campuses). Review or approval of academic programs and authority to require institutions to review existing programs varies. In terms of faculty personnel policy they are only responsible for carrying out legislative mandates for studies of issues such as faculty workload and productivity or tenure policy (ECS 1997). Overall coordinating boards clearly have less power and autonomy than governing boards; Lowry (2001, 847) , in fact, treats coordinating boards as merely extensions of the legislature or similar political principals.
The difference between consolidated governing boards and coordinating boards in terms of autonomy is offset by their differences in centralization. Governing boards with their 9 autonomy and capacity are centralized, making the logistics of interacting with them relatively easy. Coordinating boards do not centralize power but rather leave the actual power of the institutions decentralized in the various institutions. All things being equal, the lower transactions costs of the centralized governing boards means that political influence should be easier (Lowry 2001, 848) . Quite clearly all things are not equal since the centralized governing boards also have greater expertise and autonomy. This combination sets up an interesting empirical contrast between centralized structures with autonomy versus decentralized structures with less autonomy.
POLITICAL INFLUENCE ON HIGHER EDUCATION GOVERNANCE
In addition to governing boards, other political institutions are also involved in the governance of higher education within individual states. The governor and lieutenant governor have some authority over higher education. Some governors and lieutenant governors exert influence through formal powers such as appointment of board members or executives, while others exert power through influence over the legislature. In addition to governors and lieutenant governors, certain members of state legislatures also affect higher education policy.
Various positions in the legislature are allowed to appoint members to the boards, some powers delineated from the constitution are given to the legislature, and those boards whose power resides in statute can experience loss or gain depending on the character of the state legislature.
In addition, a variety of committees in state legislatures exert power over policies pertaining to higher education (ECS 1997).
Based on the education policy and bureaucratic literature, this study examines how well governing boards are able to insulate higher education policies in individual states from politics.
This study differs from previous studies because it not only examines the structure but the means 10 by which these agencies receive the powers that they have and therefore what process would have to be under-taken by political actors to influence these boards. In addition, we will examine the importance of how the board executive came to power, how powers are delineated, and the ability of the higher education boards to insulate the governance of institutions of higher education from policies driven by political desires.
Hypothesis 1: Consolidated governing boards will provide more insulation for policies from politics because of the structure and autonomy that they have and that will result in less political influence on education policy.
Hypothesis 2: Consolidated governing boards will generate lower transactions costs to political actors owing to their centralization and this will result in greater political influence on education policy.
The two hypotheses are essentially contradictory predictions. The reason for this is that the design of governing boards is influenced by two different organizational principles. This inherent theoretical conflict, in fact, might be why McGuinness (1999) concludes that the evidence is inconclusive on the benefits and costs of various structures. It also could explain the varied findings of Lowry (2001), Hearn and Griswold (1994) , Hearn, Griswold, and Marine (1996) and Volkwein (1986; .
METHODS
Our distinct theoretical contribution to the literature is to operationalize Lowry's hypothesis as an interaction between structure and politics. No prior test of this interaction exists although most of the literature in the area has not precisely specified that an interaction exists (see McLendon forthcoming). To test the hypotheses, we will code our structural variable (S) as equal to 1 if the state has a coordinating board (rather than a consolidated governing 11 board). We will then define a vector of political variables (P) as well as a vector of control variables (C). Whether or not structure facilitates or restricts the influence of political factors then can be tested by interacting structure with politics and using a joint f-test for whether the slopes of the interacted variables are different from zero (and thus different in states with consolidated governing boards from those in states with coordinating boards). More formally,
Where O is some measure of output, and the key test is whether $ 3 is equal to zero.
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Our concern is the costs of higher education and who incurs them. Four dependent variables are used. The first is simply the total dollar cost per student of public higher education in the state. Education, in an ideal world, has redistributive consequences; and to the extent that the costs of education are low, these redistributive aspects can materialize. The other three variables measure the distribution of costs; they are tuition per student, need-based scholarships and financial aid per student, and state/local appropriations per student. The basic issue is who pays for the costs of education. States that emphasize tuition place the burden on the individual student; this burden is significantly higher if states do not provide much need-based aid. In contrast states that fund more of higher education via appropriations take the burden of payment off of students and use the general tax revenues. 2 All data were taken from the Digest of Educational Statistics (National Center for Education Statistics 1998). Because the distribution of each of these variables is skewed, they will be subjected to a log transformation.
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES-POLITICAL INFLUENCE
Three clusters of political forces will be examined in this research-partisanship, ideology, and legislative characteristics. Politics in many cases means political parties. All 12 models will include both the political party of the governor (coded 1 if a Democrat and 0 otherwise) and the proportion of the legislature that are Democrats (Statistical Abstract, various years). A priori one would expect that Democratic control would be more likely to decrease the costs of education to students by increasing aid or by holding tuition down.
Although one can argue that the Democratic Party is always more liberal than the Republican Party in a given state, party is only a rough surrogate for ideology. To more directly capture the influence of ideology, we include Berry et al. 's (1996) measures of both government and citizen ideology. Government ideology attempts to measure the political ideology of government officials and thus fills in the gaps in the party measure. Citizen ideology is a measure of mass preferences. Although the general public is unlikely to affect higher education decisions directly, they could influence government officials to act on their behalf, that is to act as delegates rather than trustees. Both measures are coded on a scale of 0 to 100 with 100 being most liberal and 0 being most conservative.
The two remaining political variables are the professionalism of the state legislature and a variable for conflict in the state legislature. The conditions that these variables represent are likely to affect the policies and implementation in any state. Scholars have found that in times of high conflict in a legislature, the interest and influence of members of Congress in policies also increases (Bond and Fleisher 2000) . More legislation is introduced, and more attempts to oversee the implementation are made in an effort to claim responsibility for actions that might be beneficial to one party or another. We expect that increased activity by a legislature could result in the inability of boards to insulate the policy outputs from political influence. At the same time greater legislative conflict could keep the legislature focused on internal battles and leave it little time for overseeing the higher education system. Our indicator of legislative conflict is 13 measured by how closely the legislature is to a perfect fifty-fifty party split.
Legislative professionalism is an important variable because it provides the capacity to interact with the bureaucracy on a more equal basis. Full time legislatures who are paid more are able to commit more time and resources to actual legislation and conduct more oversight into the actions of higher education governing boards. The greater resources that more professionalized legislatures have at their discretion allows them to overcome problems of information asymmetry. According to the literature, legislatures who spend more time influencing policy are more likely to be concerned with equity, and this should result in decisions that affect the distribution of costs for higher education (Lowry 2001) . Although multi-indicator measures of legislative professionalism exist, they do not exist on an annual basis. Studies have found, however, that legislative salaries are good surrogates for legislative professionalism and that measure will be used here (Fiorina 1994; ; source: Council of State Governments various years).
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES-CONTROLS
Besides political variables, the model includes additional structural variables that might affect the implementation of policies. Several of these pertain to how a board receives its power.
First, we code whether the legal basis for board actions comes directly from the state constitution or if the powers are statutory (coded 1 if statutory, a historical justification for this variable can be found in McLendon forthcoming). Second, a dummy variable is included that measures whether or not the chief executive of the board is a member of the governor's cabinet; one might hypothesize that a cabinet post would allow the governor to have greater influence on policy.
The final structural variable included is whether or not a board is elected or appointed. This is a dummy variable coded 1 for the four states with elected boards and 0 otherwise. Appointments In addition to controlling for structural variables, the model also controls for two economic/demographic variables as well. Per capita personal income should influence the need that a state might have for either more need-based scholarships and grants or for a reduction in tuition as well as the state's ability to do so based on its income (Statistical Abstract, various years). This ability might also affect the overall distribution of higher education costs. The total fall undergraduate enrollment is included in all models in case economies of scale change the cost factors (ECS 1997). All variables other than the dummy variables were logged and thus can be interpreted as elasticities.
The analysis is a pooled time series of 47 states from 1989 to 1996. A few data points are missing for a few states and thus the pool does not total exactly 376 cases. To control for any time dominance in the pool, dummy variables for individual years are included in all regressions.
FINDINGS
Given the initial exploratory nature of this research and the two contradictory hypotheses about how structure might interact with political forces, the discussion of the findings will focus on general patterns. The use of models with several interaction terms such as these are often affected by collinearity and thus the individual regression coefficients might be unreliable.
Tables 1 through 4 present the results for the total higher education costs per student, tuition per student, state appropriations per student, and need-based aid per student respectively.
[ Tables 1-4 About Here] 15 Before progressing to the main set of hypotheses, the general impact of coordinating boards versus consolidating governing boards should be noted. The first regression coefficient in each table indicates how much impact a coordinating board has relative to a consolidated governing board. Because the variable is a dummy variable, it can be converted to a percentage change by using a binomial expansion (see Tufte 1974) . All other things being equal, states with coordinating boards have 40% lower total costs for higher education and their tuition costs per student are 52% lower (both appropriations and scholarships appear unrelated to the distinction between coordinating boards and governing boards). These are substantively large differences that indicate coordinating boards are associated with providing relatively inexpensive education.
Whether this might be a preference for low cost methods of delivery of education (e.g., community colleges or four year schools versus comprehensive universities) is the subject of future research.
The two key hypotheses are whether coordinating boards facilitate the ability of political factors to influence higher education policy or not. Unfortunately, the pattern of coefficients does not reveal a clear and consistent set of relationships. An optimal pattern might, for example, show significant relationships for the coordinating board interactions and no relationship for the noninteracted relationships (or vice versa). Instead we get a general pattern where some of the coordinating board relationships are significant and some of the governing board relationships are significant. What is clear from the tables is that higher education structures do significantly affect the ability of political forces to influence higher education. In all four cases the joint f-test shows that the sets of coefficients are significantly different from each other. This concisely shows that how politics affect higher education in states with consolidated governing boards is different from how politics affects higher education in states 16 with coordinating boards.
To illustrate the differences, the impact of legislative professionalism on tuition costs will be used (see Table 2 ). In states with consolidated governing boards, a one percent increase in legislative professionalism is associated with a .0437 percent decrease in tuition per student.
In states with coordinating boards, however, this relationship changes dramatically; and a one percent increase in legislative professionalism is associated with a .058 percent increase in tuition costs per student (the impact in coordinating board states is the sum of the two coefficients). Both coefficients are significantly different from zero and significantly different from each other.
The widely varying pattern of coefficients as politics interacts with structure suggests that the relationships are highly complex. Providing an explanation for the patterns and how those patterns should appear will require additional theoretical work. One possibility is that the relationships are even more complex than the current regressions reveal them to be. For example, the direction of impact of legislative professionalism might be a function of both the structure of higher education and the ideology or partisanship of the legislature. This notion suggests a three way or perhaps even a four way interaction of these terms.
The other structural factors that are not part of the interactive hypothesis merit some discussion. All other things being equal, elected boards are associated with 14 percent lower tuition per student and 11 percent lower state appropriations. In other words, states with elected boards favor lower educational costs. Cabinet rank also appears to matter. All other things being equal, states that provide cabinet rank for the chief education officer are associated with a 3% higher total cost per student, 6% higher tuition charges, and 4% lower state appropriations.
In short, such states appear to impose more of the costs of higher education on the student.
17
Finally, states that provide the legal authority for their higher education board via statute are associated with 8% greater total costs per student, 14% higher tuition, 6% lower state appropriations, but compliment that with a 58% percent greater allocation of financial aid. Alternatively, any political institution seeking to control a bureaucracy has lower transaction costs in a centralized bureaucracy.
CONCLUSION
Our hypotheses concerning the ability of particular structures to insulate or facilitate higher education from politics produced mixed findings. The pattern of coefficients does not reveal a clear and consistent set of relationships in terms of direction and signs. What is clear from this analysis is that higher education structures do significantly affect how political forces influence higher education. In all four cases the joint f-test shows that the sets of coefficients are significantly different from each other. This clearly demonstrates that political forces affect higher education differently in states with coordinating boards than in states with consolidated governing boards, even though the research does not provide an answer concerning exactly how structure affects political influence.
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Mixed findings such as these are obviously an invitation for further research, but they also provide insights that should be incorporated into future studies of higher education. Our findings suggest that structures affect how politics matters. Models of higher education policy should include both structural variables and political factors. This insight should not be surprising to students of public organizations, where findings consistently demonstrate that bureaucratic structures influence outputs. It is nonetheless an element that can be explored in more depth in future studies of state-run higher education systems. Even more work remains to be done theoretically to develop a set of more precise hypotheses. We need to know what kinds of political forces are mediated by the various structures, and how in combination these affect higher education policy. Models will also need to reflect the possible complex patterns of interactions among the various structures and the myriad political forces. Joint f-test for political variables (6, 349) = 6.13 p = .0000
Coefficients for dummy variables not reported *significant p < .05 Volkwein (1986; , and references therein) seek to measure autonomy and find it is not closely linked to structural form.
2.The other major sources of funds for higher education are research grants and private contributions.
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